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Statistical mechanics of random two-player games
J. Berg ∗
Institute for Theoretical Physics
Otto-von-Guericke University, Postfach 4120,
D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of
bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player
tends to infinity. We analytically calculate quantities such as the number of equilibrium points,
the expected payoff, and the fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability as a function of
the correlation between the payoff matrices of both players and compare the results with numerical
simulations.
PACS numbers: 05.20-y, 02.50.Le, 64.60.C
The adaptation to the behaviour of others and to a complex environment is a process central to economics, so-
ciology, international relations, and politics. Game theory aims to model problems of strategic decision-making in
mathematical terms: Two or more interacting participants, called players, make decisions in a competitive situation.
Each player receives a reward, called the payoff, which not only depends on his own decision, but also on those of
the other players. In the generic set-up a number of players choose between different strategies, the combination of
which determines the outcome of the game specified by the payoff to each player. Each player strives to achieve as
large a payoff as possible. One of the cornerstones of modern economics and game theory is the concept of a Nash
equilibrium [1], for an introduction see also [2]. A Nash equilibrium (NE) describes a situation where no player can
unilaterally improve his payoff by changing his individual strategy given that the other players all stick to their strate-
gies. However this concept is thought to suffer from the serious drawback that in most games there is a large number
of Nash equilibria with different characteristics but no means of telling which one will be chosen by the players, as
would be required of a predictive theory.
This conceptual problem already shows up in the paradigmatic model of a bimatrix game between two players X
and Y where player X chooses a so-called pure strategy Xi ∈ (1 . . .N) with probability xi ≥ 0 and player Y chooses
strategy Yj ∈ (1 . . .N) with probability yj ≥ 0. The vectors x = (x1, ..., xN ), y = (y1, ..., yN ) are called mixed
strategies and are constrained to the (N−1)-dimensional simplex by normalization. For a pair of pure strategies (i, j)
the payoff to player X is given by the corresponding entry in his payoff matrix aij whereas the payoff to player Y is
given by bij . The expected payoff to player X is thus given by νx(x,y) =
∑
i,j xiaijyj and analogously for player Y .
A Nash equilibrium (x∗,y∗) is defined by
νx(x∗,y∗) = maxx νx(x,y∗)
νy(x∗,y∗) = maxy νy(x∗,y) . (1)
The condition for a NE with a given set of expected payoffs νx and νy may be written as∑
j
aijyj − νx ≤ 0 xi ≥ 0 xi(
∑
j
aijyj − νx) = 0 ∀i
∑
i
xibij − νy ≤ 0 yj ≥ 0 yj(
∑
i
xibij − νy) = 0 ∀j , (2)
where we have dropped the ∗ indices for simplicity. The first column ensures that there are no pure strategies (and
thus also no mixed strategies) which will yield a payoff larger than νx to player X and νy to player Y . Thus no
player will have a reason to deviate from his mixed strategy. The second column ensures that the mixed strategies
may be interpreted as probabilities and the third ensures that νx =
∑
i,j xiaijyj and analogously for player Y . In this
situation there exists no mixed strategy which will increase the expected payoff to X if Y does not alter his strategy
and vice versa for Y . Nash’s theorem [1] states that for any bimatrix game there is at least one NE.
The third column in (2) states that whenever xi is strictly positive,
∑
j aijyj = ν
x and whenever
∑
j aijyj − νx is
strictly negative, xi is zero. Thus for a given set of strategies played with non-zero probability (out of 4
N possible
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choices), the values of all non-zero components of a mixed strategy can be determined by solving the resulting linear
equations
∑
j aijyj = ν
x ∀i : xi > 0 and
∑
i xibij = ν
y ∀j : yj > 0 subject to the normalization condition.
Apart from applications in economics, politics, sociology, and mathematical biology, there exists a wide body of
mathematical literature on bimatrix games concerned with fundamental topics such as exact bounds for e.g. the
number of NE [3] and efficient algorithms for locating them [4]. For games even of moderate size a large number of
NE are found, forming a set of disconnected points. In general the different NE all yield different expected payoffs to
the players.
However many situations of interest are characterized by a large number of possible strategies and complicated
relations between the strategic choices of the players and the resulting payoffs. In such cases it is tempting to model
the payoffs by random matrices in order to calculate typical properties of the game. This idea is frequently used in
the statistical mechanics approach to complex systems such as spin glasses [5,6], neural networks [7], evolutionary
models [8,9], or hard optimization problems [10,11]. Recently this approach has been used to investigate the typical
properties of zero-sum games [12] obeying aij = −bij . A partial analysis of bimatrix games using the so-called
annealed approximation has been given in [13].
In this paper we investigate the properties of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with a large number of pure
strategies and random entries of the payoff matrices. In this approach characteristics of the game are encoded in
the distribution of payoff matrices – with only a few parameters – instead of the payoff matrices themselves. Using
techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems such as the replica-trick we calculate the typical
number of NE with a given payoff.
The paper is organized as follows: Having set up the probability distribution of payoffs to be considered, we
construct an indicator function for NE which will allow us to count the number of NE. Then the average of the
logarithm of the number of NE over the disorder will be calculated. The solution is discussed both in game theoretic
and in geometric terms and is compared with the results of numerical simulations. Finally, we give a summary and
an outlook to future developments.
I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAYOFF MATRICES
We consider bimatrix games with square payoff matrices {aij, bij} i, j = 1 . . .N , where the thermodynamic limit
consists of N → ∞. We assume that the entries of the payoff matrices at different sites are identically and inde-
pendently distributed. Since the two payoff matrices may be multiplied by any constant or have any constant added
to them without changing the properties of the game in any material way there is no loss of generality involved in
considering payoffs of order N−1/2 and of zero mean. In the thermodynamic limit one finds that only the first two
moments of the payoff distribution are relevant, as is generally the case in fully connected disordered systems described
by mean-field theories. Hence the entries of the payoff matrices may be considered to be Gaussian distributed. Then
the only property of the distribution of payoffs which is not fixed by these specifications is the correlation κ between
entries at the same site of the two payoff matrices.
We thus choose the entries of the payoff matrices to be drawn randomly according to the probability distribution
p({aij}, {bij}) =
∏
ij
N
2pi
√
1− κ2 exp
{
−N(a
2
ij − 2κaijbij + b2ij)
2(1− κ2)
}
, (3)
i.e. a Gaussian distribution with zero mean, variance 1/N and correlation 〈〈aijbkl〉〉 = κδikδjl/N for all pairs (i, j) and
(k, l). Here and in the following, the double angles denote the average over the payoff distribution (3). For κ = −1 (3)
includes a Dirac-delta δ(aij + bij) corresponding to a zero-sum game and we recover the situation of [12] as a special
case. κ = 0 corresponds to uncorrelated payoff matrices and κ = 1 is the so-called symmetric case aij = bij where the
two players always receive identical payoffs.
Thus the parameter κ describes the degree of similarity between the payoffs to either player and can be used to
continuously tune the game from a zero-sum game to a purely symmetric game. In the former case, the gain of one
player is the loss of the other, so generally negative κ correspond to a competitive situation, whereas for positive κ
there are many pairs of strategies which are beneficial to both players.
II. THE ENTROPY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA AND THE INDICATOR FUNCTION
In this section we construct an indicator function which is zero at a NE with payoffs νx and νy to players X and
Y respectively, and non-zero everywhere else. This function will be made the argument of a properly normalized
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Dirac-delta function. Integrating the Dirac-delta function over the mixed strategies of both players, we are effectively
counting the number of NE with the specified payoffs. From the resulting spectrum of NE the statistical properties
of NE in bimatrix games may be deduced. Since we expect the number of NE to scale exponentially with the size of
the game our central tool of investigation will be the entropy of Nash equilibria defined by S(νx, νy) = 1N lnN (νx, νy)
where N (νx, νy) is the number of NE with the specified payoffs per unit interval within a small interval around νx
and νy . Since NS(νx, νy) is expected to be an extensive quantity, we may assume that S(νx, νy) is self-averaging and
in the thermodynamic limit the average value of the entropy will be realized with probability one. Hence the central
goal of our calculation will be to evaluate 〈〈S(νx, νy)〉〉.
In this framework the total number of NE is given by
N =
∫
dνxdνyeNS(ν
x,νy) , (4)
so in the thermodynamic limit the NE will be exponentially dominated by the maximum of the curve S :=
maxS(νx, νy). This implies that a randomly chosen NE will yield the payoffs where the maximum occurs with
probability 1. On the other hand, the line where S(νx, νy) = 0 delimits the smallest and the largest values of νx, νy
for which there is still an exponential number of NE.
The three expressions may be encoded in a single condition [14] by introducing the variables x˜ and y˜ with
x˜i =
{
xi xi > 0∑
j aijyj − νx xi = 0
y˜j =
{
yj yj > 0∑
i xibij − νy yj = 0 . (5)
Condition (2) may be written as
Ixi = x˜iΘ(−x˜i)− (
∑
j aij y˜jΘ(y˜j)− νx) = 0
Iyj = y˜jΘ(−y˜j)− (
∑
j x˜iΘ(x˜i)bij − νy) = 0 , (6)
so for positive x˜i, x˜i = xi, whereas for negative x˜i we have x˜i =
∑
j aij y˜jΘ(y˜j)−νx. Furthermore we have xi = 0 if x˜i <
0 and
∑
j aij y˜jΘ(y˜j)−νx = 0 for x˜i > 0. The condition xi(
∑
j aijyj−νx) = 0 is thus satisfied automatically. Analogous
relations hold for player Y . The new variables therefore serve as a convenient tool to encode the ‘complementary’
quantities xi and
∑
j aijyj − νx in a single variable. Analogous relations hold for player Y . The density of NE with
payoffs νx and νy may thus be written as
N (νx, νy) =
∫
dµ(x˜)dµ(y˜)
∏
i
δ(Ixi )
∏
j
δ(Iyj )‖
∂(Ix, Iy)
∂(x˜, y˜)
‖ , (7)
where the mixed strategies are rescaled to
∑
i xi =
∑
j yj = N so we define the measure dµ as
dµ(x˜) =
∏
i
dx˜iδ
(∑
i
x˜iΘ(x˜i)−N
)
. (8)
This scaling of the mixed strategies assumes that the an extensive number of strategies are played with non-zero
probability, so the individual terms xi and yj are all of order O(1). The integrals over x˜, y˜ effectively amount to
choosing a set of strategies with x˜i > 0 and y˜j > 0, solving the resulting linear equations for the components played
with non-zero probability, and checking if this candidate for a NE fulfills the conditions (2). It may thus be viewed
as performing the so-called support enumeration algorithm analytically [4].
III. CALCULATION OF THE TYPICAL NUMBER OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section we calculate the average of S(νx, νy) over the disorder (3). In order to represent the logarithm of (7)
we use the replica-trick lnN = limn→0 ddnNn and compute the average over Nn for integer n taking the limit n→ 0
by analytic continuation at the end. Using integral representations of the Dirac-delta function we obtain
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Nn(νx, νy) =
n,N∏
a,i
∫
dµ(x˜a)dxˆai
2pi
∏
a,j
∫
dµ(y˜a)dyˆaj
2pi
exp{−i
∑
a,i
x˜aiΘ(−x˜ai )xˆai + i
∑
a,i,j
xˆai aij y˜
a
jΘ(y˜
a
j )− iνx
∑
a,i
xˆai
−i
∑
a,j
y˜ajΘ(−y˜aj )yˆaj + i
∑
a,i,j
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )bij yˆ
a
j − iνy
∑
a,j
yˆaj }
(‖ det(D)‖)n , (9)
where a runs from 1 to n. The most awkward term of this expression is the absolute value of the normalizing
determinant, i.e. the Jacobian matrix of Ix, Iy given by
D :=
∂(Ix, Iy)
∂(x˜, y˜)
=
(
δii′Θ(−x˜i) −aijΘ(y˜j)
−bijΘ(x˜i) δjj′Θ(−y˜j)
)
. (10)
which arises from the coefficients of x˜ and y˜ in Ix and Iy. Since we are only interested in the absolute value of the
determinant, we are free to interchange rows and columns of this matrix. Rearranging the rows and columns of D
such that the pxN strategies with x˜i > 0 and the pyN strategies with y˜j > 0 are grouped together, one finds that
only the resulting quadratic submatrix of size N(px + py) by N(px + py) contributes to the determinant of D. From
(2) one finds that the distinction between px and py is immaterial since the number of strategies played by player X
at any NE always equals that played by Y and the determinant of D is zero for px 6= py. In the following we will
assume that 1N ln(detD) is a self-averaging quantity depending on px = py. Splitting off the normalizing determinant,
the average over the payoffs may now easily be performed, details of the calculations are given in appendix A. The
average over the disorder introduces a coupling between the replicas and one introduces the symmetric matrix of the
overlaps between mixed strategies of each player as order parameters,
qxab =
1
N
∑
i
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i ) , q
y
ab =
1
N
∑
j
y˜ajΘ(y˜
a
j )y˜
b
jΘ(y˜
b
j) , (11)
as well as their conjugates qˆx,yab . At non-zero values of κ we also obtain terms which couple the phase-space variables
x˜i to the auxiliary variables xˆi and similarly for player Y , so we also introduce the order parameters
Rxab =
1
N
∑
i
ixˆai x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i) , R
y
ab =
1
N
∑
j
iyˆbj y˜
a
jΘ(y˜
a
j ) . (12)
Similarly, in order to include the normalizing determinant we introduce the order parameters
pxa =
1
N
∑
i
Θ(x˜ai ) , p
y
a =
1
N
∑
j
Θ(y˜aj ) (13)
giving the fraction of strategies played at a NE.
Anticipating the limit n→ 0, the quenched average of the normalizing determinant may be computed using results
from the theory of random matrices as outlined in appendix A giving 〈〈 ln(‖ det(D)‖)〉〉 = Np(ln p− 1).
We finally obtain
〈〈Nn(νx, νy)〉〉=
∏
a≥b
∫
dqx,yab dqˆ
x,y
ab
2ipi/N
∏
a,b
∫
dRxabdR
y
ab
2ipi/(κN)
∏
a
∫
dpx,ya dpˆ
x,y
a
2ipi/N
δ(pxa − pya)
∏
a
∫
dEx,ya
2ipi/N
exp{−N
∑
a≥b
qx,yab qˆ
x,y
ab − κN
∑
a,b
RxabR
y
ab +N
∑
a
px,ya pˆ
x,y
a +N
∑
a
Ex,ya }
exp{N [Gx +Gy]}〈〈‖ det(D)‖n〉〉 , (14)
where
Gx = ln
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp{Lx({x˜a, xˆa})}
:= ln
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp{
∑
a≥b
qˆxabx˜
aΘ(x˜a)x˜bΘ(x˜b) + κ
∑
a,b
Ryabixˆ
ax˜bΘ(x˜b)− 1
2
∑
a,b
qyabxˆ
axˆb
4
−i
∑
a
x˜aΘ(−x˜a)xˆa − iνx
∑
a
xˆa −
∑
a
Exa x˜
aΘ(x˜a)−
∑
a
pˆxaΘ(x˜
a)}
Gy = ln
∏
a
∫
dy˜adyˆa
2pi
exp{Ly({y˜a, yˆa})}
:= ln
∏
a
∫
dy˜adyˆa
2pi
exp{
∑
a≥b
qˆyaby˜
aΘ(y˜a)y˜bΘ(y˜b) + κ
∑
a,b
Rxaby˜
aΘ(y˜a)iyˆb − 1
2
∑
a,b
qxabyˆ
ayˆb
−i
∑
a
y˜aΘ(−y˜a)yˆa − iνy
∑
a
yˆa −
∑
a
Eya y˜
aΘ(y˜a)−
∑
a
pˆyaΘ(y˜
a)} . (15)
In the thermodynamic limit N →∞ the integrals over order parameters in (14) may be performed by saddle point
integration. In order to be able to analytically continue the saddle-point to n → 0 we choose the replica-symmetric
(RS) ansatz for the order parameters
qx,yaa = q
x,y
1 qˆ
x,y
aa = − 12 qˆx,y1 ∀a
qx,yab = q
x,y
0 qˆ
x,y
ab = qˆ
x,y
0 ∀a > b
Rxaa = R
x
1 R
y
aa = R
y
1 ∀a
Rxab = R
x
0 R
y
ab = R
y
0 ∀a 6= b
px,ya = p
x,y pˆx,ya = pˆ
x,y ∀a
Ex,ya = E
x,y ∀a .
(16)
qx1 =
1
N
∑
i xixi denotes the self-overlap of the mixed strategies of player X , whereas q
x
0 =
1
N
∑
i x
1
i x
2
i characterizes
the overlap between the mixed strategies corresponding to two distinct NE and analogously for player Y .
The integrals over x˜a, xˆa, y˜a, yˆa may be evaluated and the limit n→ 0 may be taken as outlined in appendix A1. Gx
and Gy evaluated at the RS-saddle point are symmetric with respect to an interchange of the players X and Y . Thus
the maximum of S(νx, νy) occurs at equal payoffs and in the thermodynamic limit NE with any other combination
of payoffs will be exponentially rare by comparison. Hence we may restrict our discussion to the case νx = νy = ν,
where all order parameters are symmetric under interchange of the players.
We thus obtain the average entropy of the number of NE within RS
Sκ(ν) =
1
N
〈〈 lnN (ν, ν)〉〉 = 2 extrq1,qˆ1,q0,qˆ0,R1,R0,E,p
[
q1qˆ1
2
+
q0qˆ0
2
− κR
2
1
2
+
κR20
2
+E − p
2
+
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b) lnL(a, b)
]
, (17)
where pκ˜(a, b) with κ˜ =
κR0√
q0 qˆ0
denotes
pκ˜(a, b) =
1
2pi
√
1− κ˜2 exp(−
a2 − 2κ˜ab+ b2
2(1− κ˜2) ), (18)
and thus echoes the original distribution of the payoffs, and
L(a, b) = H
(
−ν −
√
q0b√
q1 − q0
)
(19)
+
√
p
(q1 − q0)(qˆ1 + qˆ0) + κ2(R1 −R0)2G
(
−ν −
√
q0b√
q1 − q0
)
K

 κ(R1−R0)(
√
q0b−ν)
q1−q0 −
√
q0a+ E√
qˆ1 + qˆ0 +
κ2(R1−R0)2
q1−q0

 ,
where K(x) is a shorthand for H(x)/G(x) with G(x) = 1√
2pi
exp(−x2/2), and H(x) = ∫∞
x
dy G(y). The extremum is
to be taken over all order parameters, The saddle-point equations corresponding to (17) may be solved numerically,
their solutions will be discussed in detail in section IV.
A. The distribution of the strategy strengths and the potential payoffs
In this section we calculate the distribution of strategy strengths ρx(x) = 〈〈 1N
∑
i δ(xi − x)〉〉 and the potential
payoffs ρλx(λ) = 〈〈 1N
∑
i δ(
∑
j aijyj − λ)〉〉 at NE. Due to the symmetry of (14) under an interchange of players for
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νx = νy it is sufficient to calculate these distributions for a single player only. We make use of the set of variables x˜i
introduced in section II, since the distribution ρx˜(x˜) is equal to ρx(x) for x˜ > 0 and equal to ρλx(λ − νx) for x˜ < 0.
By the same token, the fraction of strategies with xi = 0 is equal to
∫ 0
−∞ dx˜ρx˜(x˜) = 1−p and the fraction of potential
payoffs with λxi = ν
x is
∫∞
0
dx˜ρx˜(x˜) = p.
Since all pure strategies are equivalent after averaging over the payoffs (translation-invariance), we calculate
ρx˜(x˜) =
〈〈∫
dµ(x˜)dµ(y˜)δ(x˜1 − x˜)
∏
i δ(I
x
i )
∏
j δ(I
y
j )‖∂(I
x,Iy)
∂(x˜,y˜) ‖∫
dµ(x˜, y˜)
∏
i δ(I
x
i )
∏
j δ(I
y
j )‖∂(I
x,Iy)
∂(x˜,y˜) ‖
〉〉
= lim
n→0
〈〈
n∏
a=1
∫
dµ(x˜, y˜)δ(x˜11 − x˜)
∏
i,a
δ(Ixai )
∏
j,a
δ(Iyaj )
∏
a
‖∂(I
xa, Iya)
∂(x˜a, y˜a)
‖〉〉 . (20)
In order to be able to perform the average over payoffs occurring in both the numerator and the denominator, we
have represented the denominator by n− 1 replicas. The average over payoffs now proceeds exactly as in the previous
section. Introducing the matrices of order parameters qab again, the i = 1 term may be split off from the saddle point
integral without distorting the saddle point in the thermodynamic limit. Taking the replica symmetric ansatz one
obtains
ρx˜(x˜) = lim
n→0
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp {Lx({x˜a, xˆa})} δ(x˜1 − x˜) (21)
=


∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
1√
2pi(q1−q0)L(a,b)
exp{− (x˜+ν−
√
q0b)
2
2(q1−q0) } x˜ < 0
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
√
p√
2pi(q1−q0)L(a,b)
exp{− (−κ(R1−R0)x˜+ν−
√
q0b)
2
2(q1−q0) − 12 (qˆ1 + qˆ0)x˜2 + a
√
qˆ0x˜− Ex˜} x˜ > 0,
where Lx({x˜a, xˆa}) was defined in (15), the order parameters take on their saddle point values, and we have dropped
the player-indices of the order parameters. These functions have to be evaluated numerically and will be discussed in
section IVC.
The same procedure may be used to calculate another quantity of interest, namely the fraction w of pure strategies
which are both played with non-zero probability in two randomly chosen NE equilibria. Like q0, this quantity is a
measure of the degree of similarity of two randomly chosen NE. However w does not directly depend on the self-overlap
of the mixed strategies and may serve to test if there are strategies which are more likely to be played at a NE than
others. From (14) and (16) one obtains
w = lim
n→0
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp {Lx({x˜a, xˆa})}Θ(x˜1)Θ(x˜2) (22)
=
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
p
((q1 − q0)(qˆ1 + qˆ0) + κ2(R1 − R0)2)L2(a, b)
G2
(
−ν −
√
q0b√
q1 − q0
)
K2

 κ(R1−R0)(
√
q0b−ν)
q1−q0 −
√
q0a+ E√
qˆ1 + qˆ0 +
κ2(R1−R0)2
q1−q0

 .
B. The stability of the replica-symmetric saddle point
The results for the quenched average were derived on the basis of the replica-symmetric ansatz (16). In this section
we investigate the stability of this ansatz with respect to small fluctuations around (16) in order to check if this ansatz
is at least locally stable. We restrict ourselves to the special case κ = 0, where the payoff matrices are uncorrelated and
the order parameters Rxab, R
y
ab do not arise [15]. We consider small transversal fluctuations around the RS saddle-point
and expand (14) to second order in these fluctuations to obtain
S = SRS +
1
2
∆TM∆+O(∆3) , (23)
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where ∆ denotes a vector of small fluctuations in the off-diagonal elements of the order parameters qxab, qˆ
x
ab, q
y
ab, qˆ
y
ab
and M is given by
M =


∂2Gy
∂qx
ab
∂qx
cd
−I 0 ∂2Gy
∂qx
ab
∂qˆy
cd
−I ∂2Gx∂qˆx
ab
∂qˆx
cd
∂2Gx
∂qˆx
ab
∂qy
cd
0
0 ∂
2Gx
∂qy
ab
∂qˆx
cd
∂2Gx
∂qy
ab
∂qy
cd
−I
∂2Gy
∂qˆy
ab
∂qx
cd
0 −I ∂2Gy
∂qˆy
ab
∂qˆy
cd

 . (24)
Due to the symmetry of (14) under an interchange of the players at the RS saddle-point, only 3 different non-trivial
submatrices need to be evaluated. The criterion for RS to be locally stable needs to be determined by working out
the paths of integration in the complex plane of qˆx and qˆy. Denoting the replicon-eigenvalues of ∂
2Gx
∂qˆx
ab
∂qˆx
cd
, ∂
2Gy
∂qx
ab
∂qx
cd
,
and ∂
2Gy
∂qx
ab
∂qˆy
cd
by λ1, λ2, λ3 respectively one obtains the criterion for the local stability of RS
1
λ2
(λ1λ2 − (λ3 − 1)2) < 0
1
λ2
(λ1λ2 − (λ3 + 1)2) < 0 . (25)
For details of the calculation see appendix B.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The quantity Sκ(ν) contains a wealth of information. We begin by discussing the general shape of Sκ(ν) and the
number of NE as a function of κ, then turn to the statistical properties of NE and give a geometric interpretation of
the results, and finally discuss the distribution of potential payoffs and the strategy strengths.
A. Sκ(ν) and the number of NE
The expression (17) for SRSκ (ν) defines a family of curves with a pronounced maximum shown exemplarily for κ = 0
in figure 1.
0 2 4 6
ν
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
S
FIG. 1. The results of the quenched averages of Sκ(ν) for κ = −0.8 and κ = 0 respectively (bottom and top respectively).
For κ = 0 replica symmetry is locally stable for ν > 0.67 as indicated by the black dot.
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As argued in section II in the thermodynamic limit the maximum of Sκ(ν) dominates the spectrum of NE.
Another point of interest is the value of ν where Sκ(ν) crosses the S = 0 axis. Due to the symmetry of S(ν
x, νy)
under an interchange of the players this point indicates the NE with the maximum sum of the payoffs. For κ = −1
it takes on the value 0 and increases monotonously with κ. At κ = κc it diverges to infinity; Sκ(ν) no longer crosses
the S = 0 axis. In this case there is an exponentially large number of NE offering an arbitrarily large payoff to either
player, where an arbitrarily small fraction of strategies are played. From the annealed approximation one obtains
κc ≈ −.59, the corresponding result from the RS expression for the quenched average is κc ≈ −.58. This effect may
be explained as follows: At large values of κ players may pick a few of the pairs of strategies (i, j), which offer a large
payoff to both of them and play them with a large probability. An exponential number of NE may be constructed in
this way, even though their number is exponentially small compared to the total number of NE.
The entropy of NE given by the maximum Sκ of Sκ(ν) is shown in figure 2.
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
κ
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Sκ
0 0.05 0.1 0.151/N
0.16
0.21
0.26
S0
FIG. 2. The RS entropy of NE Sκ as a function of κ (solid line). The numerical results stem from enumerations with system
size N=18 averaged over 100 samples, the error-bars denote the statistical error. The inset shows the finite-size effects for the
case κ = 0. S0 is plotted against 1/N , the analytic result for N →∞ is indicated by the filled diamond.
We find Sκ=−1 = 0 since there is only a single equilibrium point for zero-sum games. Sκ increases with κ, so for all
κ > −1 the typical number of NE scales exponentially with N . The maximum of the typical number of NE is reached
for the case of symmetric games, where Sκ=1 ∼ 0.358. This result may be compared with a rigorous upper bound
for the maximal number of NE in a bimatrix game derived using geometric methods [3,4]: For any non-degenerate
N -by-N bimatrix game with large N there are at most e0.955N equilibrium points. As expected, the typical-case
scenario does not saturate this bound, at least not for the distribution of payoffs considered here. Nevertheless for
κ > −1 the typical number of NE investigated here and the maximal number of NE both scale exponentially with N .
The increase of the number of NE with the correlation between the payoff matrices may be explained as follows:
As will be discussed in the next section, the payoff ν to both players increases with κ. For increasing values of
ν = νx = νy the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a NE∑
j
aijyj ≤ νx xi ≥ 0∀i
∑
i
xibij ≤ νy yj ≥ 0∀j (26)
become increasingly easy to fulfill. In fact for ν = 0 only a single point on the simplexes of the two players fulfills
(26), whereas for large ν a correspondingly large section of the simplexes qualify as a candidate for equilibrium points
[12]. As a result the number of points which apart from (26) obey (
∑
j aijyj − νx)xi = 0 and (
∑
i xibij − νy)yj = 0
and thus constitute NE increases with κ.
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B. The statistical properties of Nash equilibria
In the thermodynamic limit not only the number of NE will be dominated by the maximum of Sκ(ν), but a randomly
chosen NE will also give the payoff ν = νx = νy = argmaxSκ(ν) with probability one, because the number of NE with
this payoff is exponentially larger than the number of all other NE. Similarly, the selfoverlap, the mutual overlap,
and the fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability will take on their saddle-point values evaluated at the
maximum of Sκ(ν) with probability 1.
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
κ
0
1
2
3
ν ,p
FIG. 3. The payoff ν (solid line) and the fraction p (dashed line) of strategies played with non-zero probability of the typical
NE. The analytic results are compared with numerical simulations for N = 50 averaged over 200 samples.
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
κ
0
2
4
6
q ,q
1 0
FIG. 4. The self-overlap of mixed strategies q1 (solid line), the overlap q0 between the mixed strategies of different NE
(dashed line), and the ratio q0/q1 (long-dashed line). The analytic results are compared with numerical simulations for N = 50
averaged over 200 samples for q1 and N = 18 averaged over 100 samples for q0.
Figure 3 shows the payoff dominating the spectrum of NE and the corresponding fraction p of strategies played with
non-zero probability, whereas the self-overlap of mixed strategies q1 and the overlap q0 between the mixed strategies
of different NE are shown in figure 4.
At κ = −1 we recover the results for zero-sum games with q1 = q0 = pi, ν = 0, and p = 1/2 [12]. As κ rises, the
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payoff increases. This effect may be understood as follows: At increasing κ the outcome of a pair of strategies (i, j)
which is beneficial to player X say, tends to become more beneficial to player Y . As a result players focus on these
strategies and the payoff at a NE to both players rises. By the same token, the fraction p of strategies which are
played with non-zero probability at a NE decreases with κ and the self-overlap q1 of the mixed strategies increases.
The geometric structure of the set of NE may be elucidated by considering the mutual overlap q0 =
1
N
∑
i x
1
ix
2
i
between mixed strategies of different NE. At κ = −1, where there is only a single NE, q0 equals the self-overlap
q1. After an initial increase q0 decreases with increasing κ. The initial increase of q0 is due to the rapid increase of
the lengths of the mixed strategy vectors and is thus not seen in the ratio between the overlaps. This result may
be interpreted geometrically in that the NE become more and more separated with increasing κ, and for κ → +1
they end up in nearly uncorrelated positions, 〈x1x2〉 − 〈x1〉〈x2〉 = .21. At the same time an increasing fraction of
components of the mixed strategies have xi = 0, i.e. lie on an edge of the simplex.
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
κ
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
w,p2
FIG. 5. The fraction of strategies w (top) played in both mixed strategies of two randomly chosen NE and the square
p2 of the fraction of strategies played at a single NE (bottom) against κ. The analytic results are compared with numerical
simulations for N = 50 averaged over 200 samples for p2 and N = 18 averaged over 100 samples for w.
Even though the NE spread over the simplex with increasing κ, players still tend to focus on specific strategies.
This may be seen by comparing the fraction of strategies w played in both mixed strategies of two randomly chosen
NE with the corresponding result p2, which would result if players chose p strategies to be played with non-zero
probabilities at random. From figure 5 one finds that although w decreases with κ consistent with the spread of NE
over the simplex it always remains above p2. This behaviour is consistent with the idea that with increasing κ players
focus on pairs of strategies which are beneficial to both, of which there is a large number for large values of κ.
Since NE are isolated points, replica symmetry describes a set of equilibrium points which are distributed uniformly
over a part of the simplex with opening angle arccos(q0/q1). A replica-symmetry breaking scenario would involve
clusters of NE, and maybe even clusters of clusters, so an ansatz explicitly including more than two overlap scales
would have to be employed along the lines of the Parisi-scheme [5]. However, at least for κ = 0, we found that
replica symmetry is locally stable for ν > 0.67 and most importantly at the maximum of the curve. RS remained
locally stable across the range of ν investigated, nevertheless RS may become locally unstable again at sufficiently
large values of ν. Thus we may conclude that for typical NE at κ = 0 the replica-symmetric ansatz is self-consistent.
Since we know from the results of [12] that RS is marginally stable at κ = −1 one may in fact speculate that for the
typical NE the RS scenario holds across the entire range of κ. Nevertheless there may well be distributions of the
payoffs which lead to non-uniform distributions of NE and to replica-symmetry breaking, presumably distributions
with large values of κ, or with correlations between the entries of the payoff matrices at different sites.
C. The distribution of potential payoffs and the strategy strengths
Figure 6 shows the distribution of strategy strengths ρx(x) = 〈〈 1N
∑
i δ(xi − x)〉〉 (x˜ > 0) and the potential payoffs
ρλx(λ) = 〈〈 1N
∑
i δ(
∑
j aijyj − λ)〉〉 (x˜ < 0) calculated in section III A. The decrease of the fraction of strategies
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played with non-zero probability,
∫∞
0 dx˜ρx˜(x˜) = p with κ is clearly visible. One also finds a marked tendency for both
players to use large values of xi and yj for decreasing values of p, as is demanded by the normalization condition.
One also observes the formation of a ‘shoulder’ in the distribution of ρx˜(x˜) = ρλx(λ − νx) (x˜ < 0) centered at −ν.
It shows that the distribution of
∑
j aijyj remains peaked at zero leading to the formation of the shoulder at x˜ = −ν
as ν increases.
−10 −5 0 5 10
x
0
0.1
0.2
ρ(x)
−10 −5 0 5 10
0
0.1
0.2
ρ(x)
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0.1
0.2
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FIG. 6. The distribution of the potential payoffs
(x˜ < 0) and the strategy strengths (x˜ > 0) for
κ = −1, 0, 1 from top to bottom
D. Comparison with numerical results
The numerical results for figure 2, 6, q0 in 4, and w in 5 were obtained by using so-called vertex enumeration to
enumerate all NE. Since the computational effort for vertex enumeration scales with ∼ 2.598N , the system size had
to be restricted to N = 18 and averages were taken over 100 samples, resulting in pronounced finite size effects.
Nevertheless the increase of the number of NE with κ is clearly confirmed by the simulations.
The numerical results for figure 3, q1 in figure 4, p in 5, and figure 6 were obtained by using an iterated variant of
the Lemke-Howson algorithm [16,4] to locate a single NE and by averaging the results for N = 50 over 200 different
realizations of the payoffs. Although some finite-size effects remain, there is good agreement between the analytical
and the numerical results.
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V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We analysed the properties of Nash equilibria in large random bimatrix games. To this end we constructed an
indicator function which was used to count the number of NE with given payoffs to both players. We found that the
number of NE is exponentially dominated by NE with a certain payoff to both players, and a certain set of order
parameters. This implies that for a randomly chosen Nash equilibrium quantities such as the fraction of strategies
played with a given probability, the self-overlap, and most importantly the payoff to either player take on a specific
value with probability 1.
We considered square payoff matrices and argued that for large games and identically and independently distributed
elements of the payoff matrices at different sites (i, j), the only relevant parameter of the probability ensemble is the
correlation between elements of the same site of the payoff matrices a and b. We then calculated the quenched average
of the number of Nash equilibria, from which one may also deduce quantities such as the payoff, the self-overlap and
the mutual overlap of mixed strategies at NE, and the distribution of the strategy strengths and the potential payoffs.
We found that both the number of equilibrium points and the payoff to both players increase with the correlation
between the payoff matrices: With increasing correlation the number of pairs of strategies which are beneficial to
both players grows. Players may focus on these pairs and achieve a larger payoff, the fraction of strategies played
with non-zero probability decreases accordingly. From the values of the saddle-point parameters one may also deduce
information on the geometric properties of NE: With increasing correlation between the payoff matrices the NE spread
out over wider regions of the simplex. These analytic results were quantitatively compared with extensive numerical
simulations and good agreement was found.
Another point of relevance is that for a sufficiently large correlation between the payoff matrices, an exponentially
large number of NE appears which offer arbitrarily large payoffs (on the statistical mechanics scale) to both players.
The number of such NE is of course exponentially small compared to the total number of NE, nevertheless these
equilibrium points may be relevant if players are free to choose equilibrium points.
A number of generalizations and extensions of these scenarios may be envisaged at this stage, including the investi-
gation of bimatrix games with rectangular payoff matrices or payoff matrices with correlations between the elements
at different sites. Furthermore, a scenario of games of several players might be extended to describe cooperative
games, where coalitions of players pool their payoffs and seek to maximize the gain of their respective coalition. In
this context it may also be interesting to consider the case of O(N) players choosing between O(1) strategies.
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank A. Engel, M. Opper, and M. Weigt for fruitful discussions and the
Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes for financial support.
APPENDIX A: THE QUENCHED AVERAGE
In the following we give a derivation of the quenched average of the entropy of NE. In order to represent the
logarithm of N we replicate n times the expression for the number of NE N (7) to obtain (9).
Treating the normalizing determinant as a self-averaging quantity, we may split off ln ‖ det(D)‖ with
D =
(
δii′Θ(−x˜i) −aijΘ(y˜j)
−bijΘ(x˜i) δjj′Θ(−y˜j)
)
. (A1)
from (9) and separately average the normalizing determinant over the disorder. Leaving out all the rows and columns
which have only the entry 1 along the diagonal and do not contribute to the determinant, we are left with the
determinant of a matrix
D′ =
(
0 −a′
−b′ 0
)
, (A2)
where the matrices a′ and b′ are the pN by pN submatrices of the payoff matrices containing the elements with x˜i > 0
and y˜j > 0. We thus calculate 〈〈‖ ln det(D)‖〉〉 as a function of px = py exploiting the block-structure of the matrix D
and using results from the theory of random matrices [17]. Since we have ln ‖ det(D)‖ = ln ‖ det(a′)‖ + ln ‖ det(b′)‖,
the correlation between the elements of these matrices has no effect. We may thus use the circular theorem [18], which
gives the average density ρ(ω) of eigenvalues ω of a pN by pN matrix with identically and independently Gaussian
distributed entries with zero mean and variance N−1
ρ(ω) =
{
(pip)−1 ‖ω‖ < √p
0 otherwise
(A3)
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giving
〈〈 ln ‖ det(D)‖〉〉 = 2Np
∫
S
dωρ(ω)‖ω‖ = Np(ln p− 1) , (A4)
where the integral is over the region in the complex plane with ‖ω‖ < √p. After this step, the only terms in (9) where
the disorder is present are
〈〈
∏
i,j
exp{i
∑
a
xˆai aij y˜
a
jΘ(y˜
a
j ) + i
∑
a
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )bij yˆ
a
j }〉〉 = (A5)
exp{−1/(2N)
∑
a,b
(
∑
i
xˆai xˆ
b
i
∑
j
y˜ajΘ(y˜
a
j )y˜
b
jΘ(y˜
b
j)
−2κ
∑
i
ixˆai x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i)
∑
j
iyˆbj y˜
a
jΘ(y˜
a
j ) +
∑
i
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i )
∑
j
yˆaj yˆ
b
j)} ,
where the indices a and b denote the replicas, a, b = 1 . . . n and the average has been taken over the distribution of
payoffs (3). In order to obtain expressions which factorize in i and j we introduce the matrices of order parameters
qxab =
1
N
∑
i
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i) , q
y
ab =
1
N
∑
j
y˜ajΘ(y˜
a
j )y˜
b
jΘ(y˜
b
j)
Rxab =
1
N
∑
i
ixˆai x˜
b
iΘ(x˜
b
i) , R
y
ab =
1
N
∑
j
iyˆbj y˜
a
jΘ(y˜
a
j )
pxa =
1
N
∑
i
Θ(x˜ai ) , p
y
a =
1
N
∑
j
Θ(y˜aj ) , (A6)
using integrals over delta functions. The last pair of order parameters is introduced so the normalizing determinant
may be included as a function of pxa and p
y
a. This procedure turns (A5) into
∏
a≥b
∫
dqx,yab dqˆ
x,y
ab
2pi/N
∏
a,b
∫
dRxabdR
y
ab
2pi/(κN)
∏
a
∫
dpx,ya dpˆ
x,y
a
2pi/N
δ(pxa − pya)
exp{−iN
∑
a≥b
qx,yab qˆ
x,y
ab − iκN
∑
a,b
RxabR
y
ab + iN
∑
a
px,ya pˆ
x,y
a }
exp{
∑
a≥b
qˆxabx˜
aΘ(x˜a)x˜bΘ(x˜b) + iκ
∑
a,b
Ryabixˆ
ax˜bΘ(x˜b)− 1
2
∑
a,b
qyabxˆ
axˆb
−i
∑
a,i
x˜aiΘ(−x˜ai )xˆai − iνx
∑
a,i
xˆai − i
∑
a
pˆxaΘ(x˜
a)}
exp{
∑
a≥b
qˆyaby˜
aΘ(y˜a)y˜bΘ(y˜b) + κ
∑
a,b
Rxaby˜
aΘ(y˜a)iyˆb − 1
2
∑
a,b
qxabyˆ
ayˆb
−i
∑
a,i
y˜ai Θ(−y˜ai )yˆai − iνy
∑
a,i
yˆai − i
∑
a
pˆyaΘ(y˜
a)} (A7)
All order parameters have been introduced via conjugate variables, except Rxab and R
y
ab, which are conjugate to each
other. Care must be taken to scale all order parameters so they are of O(1) in the thermodynamic limit. Expression
(A7) may now be substituted back into (9). The simplex-constraint is incorporated by including yet another set of
integrals
∏
a
∫
dEx,ya
2pi/N
exp{iN
∑
a
Ex,ya − i
∑
a
Exa
∑
i
x˜aiΘ(x˜
a
i )− i
∑
a
Eya
∑
i
y˜ai Θ(y˜
a
i )} . (A8)
The integrals over x˜ai , xˆ
a
i now factorize and form a product of N identical terms and may thus be written as the N -th
power of a single such term. The same point applies to the integrals over y˜aj , yˆ
a
j . Anticipating saddle points of the
integrals over conjugate order parameters along the imaginary axis, we also perform a change of variables iqˆx,yab → qˆx,yab
and analogously for Ryab, E
x,y
a , pˆ
x,y
a . Including the normalizing determinant (A4) we finally obtain (14) and (15).
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1. The replica symmetric ansatz
In the thermodynamic limit N →∞ the integrals over order parameters are dominated by their saddle point. Yet
in order to carry out the replica limes n→ 0 we have to make an ansatz for the values of the order parameter matrices.
The simplest ansatz is the replica-symmetric one given by (16). Since Gx and Gy are symmetric under interchange
of the players we may drop the superscripts x and y. We obtain
G = ln
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp{−1
2
∑
a
(qˆ1 + qˆ0)x˜
ax˜aΘ(x˜a) +
1
2
∑
a,b
qˆ0x˜
aΘ(x˜a)x˜bΘ(x˜b) (A9)
+κ(R1 −R0)
∑
a
ixˆax˜aΘ(x˜a) + κR0
∑
a,b
ixˆax˜bΘ(x˜b)− 1
2
(q1 − q0)
∑
a
xˆaxˆa
−1
2
q0
∑
a,b
xˆaxˆb − i
∑
a
x˜aΘ(−x˜a)xˆa − iν
∑
a
xˆa − E
∑
a
x˜aΘ(x˜a)− pˆ
∑
a
Θ(x˜a)} .
A particularly efficient way to disentangle the three sums over the replica-replica couplings is to use two coupled
Gaussian integrals over variables termed a and b echoing the original average over the payoff matrices, which yield
G = ln
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi
exp{−1
2
∑
a
(qˆ1 + qˆ0)x˜
ax˜aΘ(x˜a)
+κ(R1 −R0)
∑
a
ixˆax˜aΘ(x˜a)− 1
2
(q1 − q0)
∑
a
xˆaxˆa + a
√
qˆ0
∑
a
x˜aΘ(x˜a)
+ib
√
q0
∑
a
xˆa − i
∑
a
x˜aΘ(−x˜a)xˆa − iνx
∑
a
xˆa − E
∑
a
x˜aΘ(x˜a)− pˆ
∑
a
Θ(x˜a)} (A10)
:= ln
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
∏
a
∫
D(x˜a, xˆa) ,
where pκ˜(a, b) with κ˜ =
κR0√
q0 qˆ0
is defined by (18). The resulting expression factorizes giving n identical integrals over
x˜ and xˆ, which may be easily performed by considering the cases x˜ < 0 and x˜ > 0 separately. The limit n → 0 of
(14) may now be taken yielding (17)-(19).
APPENDIX B: THE STABILITY OF THE REPLICA-SYMMETRIC SADDLE-POINT
In this section we outline the calculation of the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix of (14) in order to check if the
ansatz (14) is locally stable against small fluctuations of the order parameters. We focus on the so-called replicon
modes [19] and restrict ourselves to the case κ = 0. In this case the Hessian matrix of fluctuations of (14) around (16)
is given by (24).
The derivatives of Gx and Gy are evaluated at the RS-saddle point. Due to symmetry of Gx and Gy under an
interchange of the players we have to find the replicon eigenvalues of three different submatrices of M , beginning with
∂2G
∂qˆab∂qˆcd
: At the replica-symmetric saddle point there are three different entries in the n(n−1)2 by
n(n−1)
2 matrix of
derivatives with respect to the off-diagonal elements of qˆab with a > b. These are
∂2G
∂qˆab∂qˆcd
=


P1 for a = c, b = d
Q1 for exactly one pair of indices equal
R1 for a 6= c, b 6= d
, (B1)
where
P1 = 〈x2ax2b〉 − 〈xaxb〉〈xaxb〉
Q1 = 〈x2axbxc〉 − 〈xaxb〉〈xaxc〉
R1 = 〈xaxbxcxd〉 − 〈xaxb〉〈xcxd〉 , (B2)
the pointed brackets denote the normalized averages over
14
〈(.)〉 =
∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi exp{Lx({x˜a, xˆa})}(.)∏
a
∫
dx˜adxˆa
2pi exp{Lx({x˜a, xˆa})}
, (B3)
and Lx is defined in (15) and the order parameters take on their saddle point values. In the limit n→ 0 the replicon
eigenvalue of this matrix equals
λ1 = P1 − 2Q1 +R1 =
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[∫ D(x˜, xˆ)x˜2Θ(x˜)∫ D(x˜, xˆ) −
(∫ D(x˜, xˆ)x˜Θ(x˜)∫ D(x˜, xˆ)
)2]2
=
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[
∂2
∂E2
lnL(a, b)
]2
(B4)
where D(x˜, xˆ) is defined in (A10) and L(a, b) is defined in (15).
The replicon eigenvalue of ∂
2G
∂qab∂qcd
is evaluated in the same fashion. We obtain
∂2G
∂qab∂qcd
=


P2 for a = c, b = d
Q2 for exactly one pair of indices equal
R2 for a 6= c, b 6= d
, (B5)
where
P2 = 〈xˆ2axˆ2b〉 − 〈xˆaxˆb〉〈xˆaxˆb〉
Q2 = 〈xˆ2axˆbxˆc〉 − 〈xˆaxˆb〉〈xˆaxˆc〉
R2 = 〈xˆaxˆbxˆcxˆd〉 − 〈xˆaxˆb〉〈xˆcxˆd〉 , (B6)
In the limit n→ 0 the replicon eigenvalue of this matrix equals
λ2 = P2 − 2Q2 +R2 =
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[∫ D(x˜, xˆ)xˆ2∫ D(x˜, xˆ) −
(∫ D(x˜, xˆ)xˆ∫ D(x˜, xˆ)
)2]2
=
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[
∂2
∂ν2
lnL(a, b)
]2
. (B7)
The matrix ∂
2G
∂qab∂qˆcd
also consists of three different entries. These are
∂2G
∂qˆab∂qcd
=


P3 for a = c, b = d
Q3 for exactly one pair of indices equal
R3 for a 6= c, b 6= d
, (B8)
where
P3 = −〈xaxbxˆaxˆb〉+ 〈xaxb〉〈xˆaxˆb〉
Q3 = −〈xaxbxˆaxˆc〉+ 〈xaxb〉〈xˆaxˆc〉
R3 = −〈xaxbxˆcxˆd〉+ 〈xaxb〉〈xˆcxˆd〉 . (B9)
In the limit n→ 0 the replicon eigenvalue of this matrix equals
λ3 = P3 − 2Q3 +R3 = −
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[∫ D(x˜, xˆ)x˜xˆΘ(x˜)∫ D(x˜, xˆ) −
∫ D(x˜, xˆ)x˜Θ(x˜)∫ D(x˜, xˆ)
∫ D(x˜, xˆ)xˆ∫ D(x˜, xˆ)
]2
=
∫
dadb pκ˜(a, b)
[
∂2
∂ν∂E
lnL(a, b)
]2
. (B10)
Since the replicon eigenvectors of these three matrices are parallel, the eigenvalues of (24) are those of the matrix

λ2 −1 0 λ3
−1 λ1 λ3 0
0 λ3 λ2 −1
λ3 0 −1 λ1

 (B11)
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and we denote the coefficients of replicon-fluctuations as δqx, δqˆx, δqy, δqˆy. In order to determine the criterion for local
stability of the RS-saddle point we first eliminate the fluctuations in the conjugate order parameters δqˆx and δqˆy near
the saddle point. From ∂S/∂δqˆy = 0 and ∂S/∂δqˆy = 0 one obtains δqˆx = 1λ2 (δq
x−λ3δqy) and δqˆy = 1λ2 (δqy −λ3δqx)
respectively.
This allows us to write the matrix of replicon fluctuations in terms of δqx and δqy only yielding after some algebra
S = SRS +
1
2
(δqxδqy)M ′
(
δqx
δqy
)
+O(δ3) (B12)
with
M ′ =
1
λ2
(
λ1λ2 − λ23 − 1 2λ3
2λ3 λ1λ2 − λ23 − 1
)
. (B13)
Since the integrals over the variables qx and qy are now over a real function, the criterion that the RS ansatz (14) is
locally stable is that both eigenvalues of M ′ are negative giving
1
λ2
(λ1λ2 − (λ3 − 1)2) < 0
1
λ2
(λ1λ2 − (λ3 + 1)2) < 0 . (B14)
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